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NONCONFORMING ACCEPTANCES UNDER SECTION 2-207 OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: AN END
TO THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS
Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code' represents an attempt to
resolve one of the problems engendered by the widespread use of printed forms
in business negotiations. 2 Since the forms employed in negotiations will nor-
mally contain terms that are advantageous to the party printing them, almost
inevitably there will be some discrepancy between the terms on the offeree's
form and those of the offeror's. 3 As a matter of commercial practice, these
discrepancies are usually either ignored by the parties or settled by them during
the course of performance so that at a certain stage in the negotiations, the
discrepancies notwithstanding, it becomes the expectation of the parties
that they are legally bound and that the deal is "closed." Where litigation
arises over the contract, however, one of the parties is apt to find to his chagrin
that because of the common-law rule that an acceptance varying the terms
of the offer is a counter-offer rather than an acceptance, 4 no legal obligations
1 "Section 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a
reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or
different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made condi-
tional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.
Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reason-
able time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to
establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish
a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on
which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incor-
porated under any other provisions of this Act."
2 For discussion of the purpose of § 2-207 and its probable effect on the law of sales
contracts, see 1 ANDERSON'S UNIFORM COMmmCIAL CODE 127 (1961); HAwKLAND, SALES
AN BuLK SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM CommEmc AL CODE 8 (2d ed. 1958); Corman, The
Law of Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 RuTGERs L. REy. 14, 23 (1962);
Phalan, Uniform Commercial Code-Sales-Inadvertant Acceptance of Buyer's Terms, 62
DIcK. L. Rav. 170, 171 (1958); Resnick, Conflicting Boiler Plate-Effect of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 18 Bus. LAw. 401 (1963); Note, 105 U. PA. L. Rav. 836, 850 (1957). For
an appraisal of its effect on Illinois law, see hLuiois ANNOTAONS To THE UNiFORM CoM-
MERcIAL CODE 46 (1960).
3 See Resnick, supra note 2, at 401, for an account of a typical "battle of forms."
4 1 CORBIN, CoNTRACTs § 82 (1950); R.STATmmT, CoNTa.Acrs §§ 58, 59 (1932); 1 Wir-
ISToN, CoNmTAcas §§ 72, 73, 77 (3d ed. 1957). For limitations on this general rule, see
1 CORBIN § 84; RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTs § 62 (1932); 1 WILLSTON § 79 (3d ed. 1957);
which provide that where acceptance is not made to depend on assent to the changed or
added terms (i.e., where the additions are simply proposals for additional terms), it is not
vitiated by the variances.
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have been created.5 The draftsmen of section 2-207 expressly undertook to
remove the dichotomy between law and practice in this narrow area so that
a transaction might be closed in law at the same time as it would be in "com-
mercial understanding." 6
In considering section 2-207, it must be pointed out that the section makes
a distinction between the case where the communications are merely con-
firmatory memoranda and the case where the communications represent the
offer and the purported acceptance. 7 In the former, the parties have in fact
made a contract, and the only issue before the court is the determination of
which of the terms on the confirmations are to be incorporated into the body
of the contract. Section 2-207 provides a sufficient mechanism to expedite the
treatment of such terms,8 and it would seem that a court should encounter
s The irony in the situation would of course arise from the fact that a party's real reason
for wanting to escape liability would usually be completely unrelated to the defect in the
acceptance. Thus a party who wished to be free of a contract because of a sharp shift in the
market could avoid legal obligation on the technicality that the acceptance requested an
acknowledgment and was therefore a counter-offer. See Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender,
216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915), and the discussion of the market situation surrounding
the case in FULLER, BAsIc CoNrTRAcr LAW 178 (1947). See also, e.g., In re Marcalus Mfg.
Co., 120 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J. 1954) (request for acknowledgment in acceptance renders
it a counter-offer); Whitelaw v. Brady, 3 Ill. 2d 583, 121 N.E.2d 785 (1954) (where offer
leaves date of installment payments open, "acceptance" which filled in the dates held not
to operate as acceptance); New York Overseas Co. v. China, Japan & So. Am. Trading
Co., 118 Misc. 744, 194 N.Y. Supp. 552 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (where acceptance provided for
paper to "match sample as closely as possible," held no contract because offer requested
paper to "conform with sample"); Cohn v. Penn Beverage Co., 313 Pa. 349, 169 Atl. 768
(1934) (held no contract because acceptance stated payment of ten per cent cash, and in
absence of statement offer is presumed to be for cash). In some instances, the courts have
seen fit to mitigate the harshness of the rule. See, e.g., Podany v. Erickson, 235 Minn. 36,
49 N.W.2d 193 (1951) (acceptance effective despite request for abstract); Valashinas v.
Koniuto, 308 N.Y. 233, 124 N.E.2d 300 (1954) (attempt by offeree to set approximate
closing date did not make acceptance conditional); Orr v. Doubleday, Page & Co., 223 N.Y.
334, 119 N.E. 552 (1918) (request for acknowledgment held not essential to operation of
agreement and therefore does not vitiate acceptance); cf. Celanese Corp. of America v.
John Clark Indus., 214 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1954). These cases are, of course, in the minority.
6 Section 2-207, comment 2: "Under this Article a proposed deal which in commercial
understanding has in fact been closed is recognized as a contract. Therefore, any additional
matter contained either in the writing intended to close the deal or in a later confirmation
falls within subsection (2) and must be regarded as a proposal for an added term unless
the acceptance is made conditional on the acceptance of the additional terms."
7 Section 2-207, comment 1: "This section is intended to deal with two typical situations.
The one is where an agreement has been reached either orally or by informal correspondence
between the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties sending formal acknowl-
edgments or memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding terms
not discussed. The other situation is one in which a wire or letter expressed and intended
as the closing of confirmation of an agreement adds futher minor suggestions such as 'ship
by Tuesday,' 'rush,' 'ship draft against bill of lading inspection allowed,' or the like."
8 Section 2-207(2) provides the same mechanism whether the variant terms appear on an
acceptance or a confirmatory memorandum insofar as "material" variances will be included
in the contract only in the event of express awareness on the part of the other party, see
§ 2-207, comments 3 and 4, and "immaterial" variances will be included unless objection
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little or no difficulty in its application in this context. 9 The second situation,
however, occurs where an offer has been made, typically a purchase order, and
the offeree's acknowledgment or acceptance contains additional or inconsist-
ent terms. The problem here becomes substantially more complex since before
the court can consider the variant terms it must first make the fundamental
inquiry into whether or not the circumstances indicate that the parties have
intended to be legally bound at all. By virtue of section 2-207, the court can
no longer rest its solution of the problem on the mere presence of the variant
terms, and it must therefore inquire into the history of the transaction and the
surrounding commercial environment in order to ascertain the parties' intent.
The First Circuit opinion in Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co.1O gives some
indication of the judicially created difficulties in this inquiry.
I. Ti Roto-Lith CASE
The plaintiff-buyer, a manufacturer of cellophane bags for the packaging
of vegetables, placed an order with the defendant-seller for the purchase of
a quantity of cellophane adhesive manufactured by the latter. The seller's
"acceptance"" of the order was on a printed form providing, in boldface
type, that: "All goods sold without warranties, express or implied, and subject
to the terms on the reverse side."12 Included among the terms on the back
of the form was the statement: "If these terms are not acceptable, Buyer must
so notify Seller at once." 13 The emulsion was shipped thereafter and was
received and paid for by the buyer shortly after the buyer was presumed as
a matter of law to have received the acceptance.14 At no time did the buyer
to them is reasonably given, see § 2-207, comment 5. In the case of written confirmations,
a conflict in terms is considered to satisfy the requirement of objection. The conflicting
terms, then, do not become part of the contract. See § 2-207, comment 6. The text of this
comment is set out in note 66 infra. It appears that the previous inability of courts to resolve
the problem of the disposition of the additional terms in a manner consistent with the classic
"meeting of the minds" concept was a serious impediment in their attempts to reach com-
mercially sound decisions. See, e.g., Nundy v. Matthews, 41 N.Y. (34 Hun) 74 (1884);
Hutchinson Baking Co. v. Marvell, 270 Pa. 378, 113 Atl. 433 (1921); RESTATEMENT,
CoNTRAcTs § 59, comment (1932).
9 Problems might arise in determining whether a variance is "material" or "immaterial"
and in determining whether terms are actually in conflict or rather are compatible, though
slightly contradictory.
10 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
11 The seller actually sent two documents, an acknowledgment and an invoice, which
were identical. The acknowledgment would appear to be a "written confirmation" of the
type contemplated by § 2-207(1). But see Note, 57 Nw. U. L. R.v. 477 (1962) which makes
the doubtful contention that the acknowledgment was not an acceptance because it did not
use specific language of acceptance.
12 297 F.2d at 498. 13 Id. at 499.
14 The plaintiff-buyer's principal witness testified that he did not know whether the ac-
knowledgment had been received or not. The court held there was thus an unrebutted
presumption of receipt. .d. at 498.
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either object to the terms contained in the acceptance or indicate his assent
to them. Subsequently the emulsion failed to adhere and the buyer instituted
an action for damages.' 5 The district court directed a verdict for the seller and
an appeal was taken to the First Circuit.
The buyer's position, insofar as it appears in the text of the opinion, was
that under section 2-207, comment 4,16 the disclaimer of warranty constituted
a "material" variance; that the seller's communication effected a completed
agreement without the disclaimer; and that when the buyer failed expressly
to assent the disclaimer never became part of the contract. 17 While conceding
that the disclaimer was a "material" variance of the type contemplated by
comment 4,18 the Court of Appeals rejected the remainder of the buyer's
argument. Characterizing section 2-207 as an attempt "to modify the strict
principle that a response not precisely in accordance with the offer was a
rejection and a counter-offer,"19 the court said it was nonetheless inapplicable
to the facts of this case. The disclaimer was held sufficient to make the com-
munication a counter-offer, and the buyer was held to have accepted this
counter-offer when he received, paid for and used the emulsion. The court also
observed that it would be an "absurdity" to apply section 2-207 where the
additional conditions are "unilaterally burdensome upon the offeror" 20 inas-
much as no offeror would ever assent to such conditions, and that under
such circumstances the court would read the acceptance as being "expressly
conditional" within the meaning of section 2-207(1).21
1s See Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 132, 135 (1962), which takes the position that since the
buyer's action was for consequential damages (Brief for Appellant, pp. 15-17), the case
could have been decided on the ground that the response contained a limitation on liability.
297 F.2d at 499. However, this contention rests on the view that the limitation on liability
was an "immaterial" variance. There is nothing in the Code to indicate that a limitation
on liability is "immaterial" and it is highly probable that in fact most businessmen would
consider it rather "material."
16 Section 2-207, comment 4: "Examples of typical clauses which would normally 'mate-
rially alter' the contract and so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without
express awareness by the other party are: a clause negating such standard warranties as
that of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose in circumstances in which either
warranty normally attaches.. .. "
17 If the buyer was correct in his premise that the disclaimer was merely a "material" vari-
ance from the offer, then his conclusion was correct since the case would then fall squarely
under § 2-207(2) and comments 3 and 4.
1 297 F.2d at 499. 19 I. at 500.
20 "If plantiff's contention is correct that a reply to an offer stating additional conditions
unilaterally burdensome upon the offeror is a binding acceptance of the original offer, plus
simply a proposal for the additional conditions, the statute would lead to an absurdity.
Obviously no offeror will subsequently assent to such conditions." Ibid.
21 "To give the statute a practical construction we must hold that a response which states
a condition materially altering the obligation solely to the disadvantage of the offeror is
an 'acceptance... expressly.., conditional on assent to the additional... terms.'" Ibid.
The text of § 2-207(1) is set out in note 1 supra.
19631
544 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:540
II. SCmToNs 2-207 AND 2-204: ThE REQumEMENT
OF "DEFINITE" ACCEPTANCE
Regardless of whether the outcome of the litigation is considered commer-
cially sound, it would appear that the court's rationale for the decision is
wholly unsatisfactory. To the extent that the Roto-Lith opinion may be read
as suggesting that a unilaterally burdensome provision is equivalent to an
express condition within the meaning of section 2-207(1), it finds little support
in the language or history of the statute. From a purely semantic standpoint,
a "unilaterally burdensome provision" and an "express condition" are not
equivalent, and equating them contravenes explicit legislative direction. The
phrase "expressly made conditional" was not originally present in the sec-
tion,22 but it was included among the revisions proposed by the Editorial
Board in 1956.23 The reason for the change was "to express more clearly what
was intended." 24 It was obviously an attempt to enlarge upon the freedom
afforded the offeree in the 1952 text of the section.25 On the Board's recom-
mendation, it was incorporated in the 1957 Official Draft and was retained
unaltered in the 1958 Official Draft, the present version of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. In view of the careful consideration the draftsmen evidently
gave this phrase, and more importantly, in view of the fact that allowing the
offeree more freedom than it affords would in effect vitiate section 2-207,26
it would appear that literal application of the "expressly conditional" clause
is the broadest definition of the offeree's freedom that should be demanded of
the courts.
It appears that the difficulty which the Roto-Lith court experienced in its
attempt to apply section 2-207 resulted in large part from a misunderstanding
22 Section 2-207 of the 1952 Official Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code reads as
follows:
"(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which
is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon.(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract and
between merchants become part of the contract unless they materially alter it or notifi-
cation of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time."
23 A.L.I., 1956 REcOMMENDATIONs OF THE EDIrOLAJ BOARD FOR noE UNIFORm Co 'mR-
CIAL CODE 28.
24 Ibid.
25 See Note, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 836, 855 and n. 81 (1957).
26 This would be particularly true if the "unilaterally burdensome" standard promulgated
by the Roto-Lith court were to be adopted by the courts. It is extremely unlikely that a
businessman will have forms printed without including a few provisions that ask concessions
of the offeror. On the other hand, contrary to the view of the Roto-Lith court there are
numerous business reasons why an offeror might voluntarily assent to such "burdensome"
terms. A desire to get goods quickly and avoid "red tape," hopes of doing business with
the offeree again, and a desire to enhance one's business reputation as a fair man are among
the more obvious motivations.
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of the function that section is to serve in the resolution of the offer-acceptance
problem. One of the primary characteristics of the Code is a constant inter-
dependence among its various sections. Therefore, if a particular section is
removed from its proper context and is considered without reference to other
relevant sections, a substantial opportunity for distortion and misapplication
arises. The court's treatment of section 2-207 presents a clear example of the
danger inherent in such categorization. For, if section 2-207 is to be controlling
in a particular transaction, it must first be found that the communication of
the offeree was a "definite" acceptance, 27 that he in fact intended to be legally
bound. In the determination of this question, section 2-20428 is controlling
and section 2-207 is of only corollary significance. The latter section only pro-
vides that the mere inclusion of additional or different terms does not render
ineffective an otherwise valid acceptance. Section 2-207 is simply a device
to aid the courts in the basic section 2-204 determination of whether or not
the parties have reached an agreement. Moreover, regardless of the form
of the expression of acceptance, the court should also ascertain whether
the offeree engaged in any other activity that might constitute an acceptance
under section 2-206.29 Where such conduct is present, section 2-207 becomes
irrelevant to the issue of acceptance.3 0 The Roto-Lith court considered neither
1
27 The text of § 2-207(1) is set out in note 1 supra. The title, text and comments of § 2-207
indicate that it applies only where all other criteria of intent indicate a contract has been
formed. When such other criteria are met, § 2-207 becomes relevant as to the significance
and treatment of additional terms, regardless of whether or not the acceptance contains a
term of express condition.
28 "Section 2-204. Formation in General.
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the
moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefi-
niteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy."
29 "Section 2-206. Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract.
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner
and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances;
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall be con-
strued as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt
or current shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods, but such a shipment
of non-conforming goods does not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably
notifies thebuyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation to the buyer.
(2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance
an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer
as having lapsed before acceptance."
30 The structure of the Code would seem to indicate that the terms of § 2-207 should be
applied only when ambiguity exists as to whether the actions of the offeree are an acceptance
under § 2-206. If the conduct of the offeree is initially found to be an acceptance, then
§ 2-207 is no longer required in this determination and is only pertinent with respect to
ascertaining the terms of the contract.
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section 2-204 nor section 2-20631 but rather went directly, and exclusively, to
section 2-207. As a result of its failure to apply sections 2-204 and 2-206, the
court found itself confronted with a communication which it obviously felt
was not an acceptance and was forced to expand the only escape section 2-207
afforded-the "expressly conditional" clause.32 If, however, it had initially
turned to section 2-204(l),33 the court could have disposed of the case on the
ground that the facts were not sufficient to "show agreement" between the
parties. Although such a holding probably would not have made the decision
any more palatable from a commercial standpoint, 34 it at least would not
have represented an overt disfortion of section 2-207.
The Roto-Lith court is not alone in its failure to recognize that section 2-207
cannot be treated individually but rather must be considered in conjunction
with the other sections of the Code concerning the formation of a contract.
The same misunderstanding is apparent in the fears voiced by a number of
commentators that section 2-207 may serve to bind offerees to contracts to
which they do not intend to be bound or to render offerors something less
than the masters of their offers. 35 When it is remembered that section 2-207
operates in conjinction with section 2-204, this apprehension appears to be
for the most part groundless.
Though variance is not of itself sufficient to render an acceptance ineffective,
discrepancies between offer and acceptance are not irrelevant. The amount
and degree of variance, when taken in conjunction with such factors as:
(1) the phrasing of the communication; (2) the relevant usage of trade or
course of dealing between the parties;36 (3) the conduct of the parties with
respect to the alleged contract; 37 and (4) the added weight that should be
given to variances that appear in non-form clauses, 38 may be crucial in
31 Sections 2-204 and 2-206, of course, are not the only sections of the Code that may
be relevant to a consideration of the formation and contents of a contract. Sections 2-202,
2-208 and 2-209 also appear to be of importance.
32 For additional discussion on this point, see Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 132, 134 (1962).
33 Set out in note 28 supra.
34 For a discussion of the commercial soundness of the Roto-Lith decision, see pp. 550-
51 infra.
35 See, e.g., H. Levy, A Study of the Uniform Commercial Code, 59 COM. L.J. 329, 331
(1953); Phalan, supra note 2, at 171-72; Note, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 836, 854 (1957).
36 For evidence that trade usage and course of dealing would be relevant here, see the
Code definition of "agreement" in § 1-201(3).
37 The conduct of the parties would seem to be relevant insofar as it is indicative of their
intentions and belief as to whether the deal has been "closed." In addition, it is possible
that the conduct of the offeree, apart from his written response to the offer, might warrant
a finding of acceptance under § 2-206 set out in note 29 supra.
39 The fact that the additional or different terms appear in a non-form communication,
or were added to a form, would support the position that the offeree did not intend to be
bound to any contract that failed to include them. While there is no express provision in§ 2-207 to exempt such written variances from its operation, consideration of comment 1,
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making the section 2-204 determination as to whether the parties did in fact
intend to make a contract. As Professor Hawkland states:
The critical question to answer is, has the offeree expressed the notion
that the deal is closed? If the offeree expresses the notion that the deal
is closed, it is "closed" even though he has made some counter-proposals
to the original proposition. In each case a determination must be made
to ascertain whether the counter-proposals militate against a finding of
an expression of a "closed deal"; but if the expression of a "closed deal"
is found, both parties are bound by a contract, even though the offeree
has stated terms materially different from those offered.39
Thus the problem of determining whether a term in the "acceptance" is merely
a "material" variance of the type contemplated by section 2-207, or is in fact
a variance so fundamental to the contract as to vitiate its existence should be
solved by recourse to the provisions of section 2-204(1) and (3),40 rather than
by application of the "expressly conditional" clause of section 2-207. When
sections 2-204, 2-206 and 2-207 are placed in their proper relationship, and
the necessary interaction between them is recognized, a thorough-going appli-
cation of section 2-207 can be entirely consistent with adequate protection for
both of the parties to the contract.
III. THE PRiNT ASSENT CLAUSE
This observation should not suggest, however, that no ambiguity or diffi-
culty exists in the application of the "expressly conditional" clause. The basic
problem presented is whether form clauses in the offeree's response, which
stipulate that "acceptance is conditional on the offeror's assent to any and
all additional terms," should be recognized as rendering the acceptance "ex-
pressly conditional" within the meaning of section 2-207(1). It may be argued
in opposition to recognition that: (1) the clauses represent a blatant attempt
on the part of draftsmen to avoid section 2-207; (2) the assurance that the
offeror's assent provides is rarely needed, and in effect is a "club" wielded
by the offeree in order to advance his position in the so-called "battle of
forms"; (3) the recognition of such clauses will to a substantial extent nullify
the effect of section 2-207 since a large percentage of forms contain such an
"express assent" condition or its equivalent; and (4) the clauses are not re-
garded by businessmen as limitations on liability but are rather inserted to
set out in note 7 supra, and comment 2, set out in note 6 supra, lends credibility to such a
distinction. Also, it might be argued that a party "intends what he writes." For an argument
that § 2-207 should distinguish between form and non-form communications, see Note 105
U. PA. L. Rav. 836, 855 (1957). A.L.I., SuPPrMANT No. 1 TO THE 1952 OmciAL DRhFr
OF TExT AND COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 6-7 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as A.L.I. SuPPLEMENT No. 1], suggested such a distinction but even in the case of written
communications still required words of "explicit" condition.
39 7 ILL. S.B.A., CoMMERcE, BANKNG & BANKRUPTCY NEWSLErER 5 (Apr. 1962).
40 The text of these subsections is set out in note 28 supra.
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placate counsel.41 On the other hand, if the courts categorically disregard the
conditions, or disregard them when there is no independent commercial reason
why express assent should be demanded, then a party who for reasons wholly
sufficient to himself wishes to condition his acceptance on the offeror's assent
to a seemingly trivial term cannot do so without the trouble and expense of
writing in specific words of condition. Thus it remains true that complete
refusal to give effect to these printed conditions would result in both a sub-
stantial reduction in the efficacy and convenience of forms and a limitation
on a party's freedom of contract.
However, it may be doubted that the mere inclusion of such a printed
clause is any more indicative of an intention on the offeree's part not to be
unconditionally bound than is the inclusion of the additional term itself. It
also may not be reasonable to assume that the assent clause actually came to
the offeror's attention. Thus it would seem that an assent clause tucked away
on the back of a form should be totally disregarded by the courts. If, however,
the assent clause is "conspicuous" as defined by the Code,42 there would seem
to be a valid argument for granting it limited recognition. By definition, the
offeror could be held to have taken notice of it as a matter of law. Moreover,
it would certainly not be unreasonable to raise the presumption that by placing
the clause in conspicuous print the offeree has manifested an intention, objec-
tively determined, to make his acceptance conditional upon the offeror's assent
to the nonconforming terms. Once such an intention is ascertained, it is incum-
bent upon the courts to act in accordance with it.
This is not to suggest that the mere presence of a conspicuous assent clause
constitutes conclusive evidence that the offeree does not intend to be bound
to a contract at this stage of the negotiations. All that is meant here is that
such a conspicuous clause should be given weight in the section 2-204 inquiry
into the creation of the contract. Although the absence of any sound commer-
cial reason to require assent should not constitute sufficient grounds for dis-
regarding such clauses, any action by the offeree inconsistent with an intention
not to be bound should be considered by the courts. Thus, if a manufacturer
mails an acceptance with a conspicuous assent clause and then commences
production of the goods without waiting for a reply, this would tend to rebut
the presumption of conditional acceptance raised by the assent clause. This
is particularly true where the goods are made to order. Shipment by the seller
would militate even more strongly against a finding that the acceptance was
41 For a particularly cogent argument in opposition to the recognition of such conditions,
see Note, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 836, 856-68 (1957).
42 Section 1-201(10) "'Conspicuous': A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so
written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it.
A printed heading in capitals (as: NoN-NEGOTmiE BuL oF LADiNG) is conspicuous. Lan-
guage in the body of a form is 'conspicuous' if it is in larger or other contrasting type or
color. But in a telegram any stated term is 'conspicuous.' Whether a term or clause is
'conspicuous' or not is for decision by the court."
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conditional. In addition, proof that the parties chose to ignore such clauses
in previous dealings should weigh against a finding of non-acceptance. 43 In-
deed, it may be that production or shipment by the offeree would in itself
qualify as an acceptance under section 2-206,44 in which case the entire "ex-
pressly conditional" issue would become moot. However, in the small number
of cases where the assent clause is conspicuous and production, shipment or
prior course of dealing do not militate against its recognition, the assent clause
should be recognized as conclusive evidence that the offeree did not intend
his communication to consummate the contract.
Although such a "conspicuousness" standard may seem somewhat artificial
and may also lead to circularity in argument,45 it would still seem the most
feasible solution to the policy dilemma fostered by section 2-207. Such a course
would preserve the integrity of the form, for requiring a party to print his
forms so that a court can readily ascertain his intention is certainly not an
unreasonable restraint on freedom of contract. The argument that recognition
of the form assent clause would serve to nullify section 2-207 also loses most
of its vitality under these circumstances. Since a requirement of conspicuous-
ness necessitates some sort of affirmative action on the part of businessmen
with respect to their "acceptance" forms, it should make them aware46 of the
legal significance of their action: That communications containing such con-
ditions will leave the offeror as well as offeree free to escape the contract with
immunity.4 7
43 Where the parties in a prior course of dealing have chosen to ignore the assent clause,
it would seem inequitable to allow one party to invoke it to avoid a disadvantageous con-
tract. However, an argument of bad faith could be advanced in these circumstances as well
as a contention that the prior course of dealing serves as a waiver of the assent clause.
See §§ 2-208, 2-209.
44 Set out in note 29 supra.
4s If a court were to employ what it construes to be the intent of the offeree as a criterion
in determining "conspicuousness," it would of course be clearly in error. The intent of the
offeree is to be ascertained by the "conspicuousness" of the clause and not vice versa.
46 It may be that this contention is based upon an exaggerated estimate of the influence
the existing law exerts on the drafting of forms. It must be assumed, however, that business-
men, and more particularly their lawyers, know something of the applicable law.
47 It could perhaps be argued that § 2-207(1) uses the phrase "expressly made conditional"
and that a requirement of conspicuousness is hence precluded by clear legislative direction.
However the position taken here does find support in the section's legislative history. The
1954 recommendations concerning § 2-207, contained in A.L.I., SUPPLEMENT No. 1, supra
note 38, in attempting to afford the offeree some freedom to maneuver, recognized assent
clauses when they were "explicit" in the case of non-form communications, A.L.I., SUPPLE-
wMNT No. 1 § 2-207(2), and "conspicuous" in the case of form communications, A.L.I.,
SUPPLEMENT No. I § 2-207 (4)(b). The 1956 RECOMMENDATIONs and subsequent Official
Drafts, see note 23 supra and accompanying text, did not purport to distinguish between
form and non-form communications. Thus it is not unreasonable to assume that the drafts-
men did intend to include a requirement of "conspicuousness" when they adopted the
"expressly made conditional" clause to apply to all acceptances. Certainly such a require-
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If one accepts this solution to the assent clause dilemma, consideration of
the fact situation in Roto-Lith would seem to indicate that the outcome, as
well as the ratio decidendi of the decision, was incorrect. Even if the printed
assent clause 4s were found to meet the Code standard of "conspicuousness," 49
an unlikely result,5 0 the offeree's shipment of the goodssi should have pre-
cluded any assertion on his part that he did not intend the deal to be "closed"
at the time the acknowledgment was mailed. It seems unlikely that a business-
man would immediately ship goods without waiting for the offeror's response
to his "counter-offer" if he did not consider the contract consummated. Cer-
tainly his delivery of the goods to the offeror could reasonably have been
interpreted by the latter as an acceptance of the offer.5 2 Indeed, since the
offer requested immediate shipment,53 it could be argued that performance
was precisely the form of acceptance the offer contemplated and that such
performance completed the contract in accordance with section 2-206(l)(b).54
Thus there was nothing in the facts to indicate to the offeror that the deal
was anything but "closed" when the goods arrived. It becomes evident, then,
that to recognize the assent clause where shipment has been made is to grant
ment would be entirely consistent with the desire to avoid surprise and unfairness evinced
throughout the Code. See, e.g., § 2-207, comment 4.
In addition to the inference to be drawn from the legislative history of the section, the
argument for reading "expressly" to mean "conspicuously" also draws support from the
fact that since a limitation on acceptance could hardly be other than express, the draftsmen
must have added the word "expressly" in order to require something more than a mere
statement of a desire to limit the effect of the acceptance. Of course, "express" need not
mean "conspicuous" elsewhere in the Code where no support for such a reading can be
drawn from the legislative history and where the condition was of a sort that could be implied
if the word were not included.
48 297 F.2d at 499. The court italicized this clause in the opinion but did not appear to
rest its reasoning upon it.
49 Although the court made a point of mentioning that the clause was conspicuous, id.
at 498, it did not indicate whether it was so holding as a matter of law under § 1-201(10).
50 Section 1-201(10) provides that "language in the body of a form is 'conspicuous' if
it is in larger or other contrasting type or color." There is no indication that the clause here
satisfied these requirements and in fact the contrary seems likely. Moreover, its position on
the back of the form would tend to militate against a finding of "conspicuousness."
51 The purchase order was mailed on October 23 by the offeror in New York to the offeree
in Massachusetts. On October 26 the offeree prepared his acknowledgment and mailed it
out on the same day. The offeree then shipped the goods the following day, October 27,
without having received any additional communication from the offeror. 297 F.2d at 498.
52 Indeed, it would seem that the offeror had no choice but to interpret the shipment
as acceptance lest he run the risk of placing himself in breach of contract. It would be
unreasonable to have expected him to anticipate the Roto-Lith court's view that refusal of
shipment would not have constituted breach.
53 Brief for Appellee, p. 7.
54 Set out in note 29 supra. The situation in Roto-Lith would appear to be exactly the
type intended to be covered by this subsection. Thus, if the offeror had refused to accept
the goods because of the disclaimer in the acknowledgment, the offeree could have main-
tained a successful action for breach of contract under § 2-206(1)(b).
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the offeree both his contract and the unilateral power to strike out unfavorable
provisions while adding beneficial ones.55 Whether the offeree's delivery of the
goods is characterized as an acceptance within the meaning of section 2-206,
or his entire conduct is considered as indicating agreement under section 2-204,
it seems clear that the court in Roto-Lith should have refused to recognize
even a conspicuous printed assent clause.5 6
A discussion of the printed assent clause must also mention its counterpart,
the printed term in the offer limiting acceptance to the terms of the offer. 57
This problem, however, appears to be insignificant since such a clause's effect
would necessarily be limited to immaterial variances in the acceptance.5 8
There seems to be no compelling reason why the courts should disregard
these provisions.59 In fact they may be of some utility in relieving a court of
the burden of distinguishing between "material" and "immaterial" variances.6o
Of course conspicuousness should be required for recognition of provisions
55 As is indicated by notes 52 and 54 supra, the Roto-Lith court's view would allow the
offeree to place the offeror in an impossible situation. By apparently performing his obliga-
tions under the contract, the offeree could put the offeror in a position where he also must
perform. Yet by wording his written reply so that it technically is not an acceptance, the
offeree could claim in any subsequent litigation that the writings themselves are insufficient
to establish a contract and that therefore the terms of the contract formed by the parties'
conduct should be supplied by § 2-207(3). See note 1 supra. Thus by careful drafting, he
could successfully nullify any terms in the offer that he does not consider to be to his advan-
tage and could add terms favorable to himself. When §§ 2-204, 2-206 and 2-207 are properly
applied, an offeree will rarely be in a position to engage in such devious manipulations.
See HAwKLAND, SALEs AND BULK SAtis UNDER THE UNiFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 10 (2d
ed. 1958).
56 An additional ground for refusing to give full effect to such ambiguous behavior on
the part of the offeree is supplied by § 2-208. Under that section, a court could hold that
by virtue of his conduct with respect to the contract, the offeree has waived the limitation
of the assent clause.
57 Section 2-207(2)(a) provides for the recognition of such conditions. Here also the only
explicit requirement for recognition is "expressness."
58 Since there must be express assent by the offeror for a "material' variance to become
a part of the contract, any prior objection by means of a conditional offer is unnecessary.
59 See Application of Doughboy Indus., Inc., 233 N.Y.S.2d 488 (App. Div. 1962),
involving an arbitration clause. The buyer's form contained no such clause and stated that
only signed consent would bind the buyer to any additional terms. The seller's form had a
general arbitration provision and stated that silence or failure to object in writing would be
considered acceptance of its terms and conditions. Although the Uniform Commercial Code
is not yet in effect in New York, the court hypothesized as to how the case would be decided
under § 2-207 and reached the conclusion that the condition in the buyer's form would have
to be given effect and that the arbitration clause would not be part of the contract. It does
not appear that the clauses in either the buyer's or the seller's form were "conspicuous."
60 The Doughboy case, supra note 59, offers an example. The court reached its hypothetical
§ 2-207 decision on the grounds that "the arbitration clause, whether viewed as a material
alteration under subsection (2), or as a term nullified by a conflicting provision in the buyer's
form, would fail to survive as a contract term." Id. at 495.
Although § 2-207 gives no explicit directions as to how to distinguish between "material"
and "immaterial" variances it would seem that when such a distinction becomes necessary,
it should be made on the basis of trade usage or prior course of dealing.
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in offers for the same reasons that it is demanded of assent clauses. 61 Notice
with respect to the conditional offer would be of particular importance.
IV. MiSCARRmAGE Op AN ACCEPTANCE uNDER SECTION 2-207
Another problem which might arise under section 2-207 involves the accept-
ance or acknowledgment that miscarries. The court in Roto-Lith recognized
this problem but withheld further comment.62 Under the common-law rules
applicable to contracts by correspondence, an acceptance is effective upon
mailing, and it does not lose this effectiveness by virtue of being lost in
transit.6 3 This rule can be reconciled with section 2-207 without difficulty
except where a lost acceptance contained "immaterial" variances. 64 Although
in the normal situation these variances become part of the contract without
express assent by the offeror, it would seem that the opposite result is advis-
able in cases where the acceptance miscarries. By hypothesis, the offeree is
willing to be bound with or without these non-conforming terms and hence
it does not seem equitable to bind the offeror when he has neither seen them
nor had the opportunity to object to their inclusion in the contract. In view,
however, of the extraordinary tenacity of the common-law rule relating to
contracts by correspondence and the blind devotion it inspires in some courts,
it would no doubt be beneficial if section 2-207 were to be clarified on this
point.
The treatment of the terms of a miscarried confirmatory memorandum
should depend upon whether or not they contradict terms in the other party's
confirmation. If the terms do not contradict, the rule urged for miscarried
acceptances should apply because they are simply proposed additions to the
contract. If the miscarried terms do contradict terms on the other memoran-
dum, however, a slightly different problem is presented.6 5 Section 2-207, com-
ment 6,66 states that a conflict between terms in confirmatory memoranda
61 Here again "conspicuousness" should be required both to avoid surprise and indicate
the buyer's "real" intent to limit his offer.
62 297 F.2d at 500 n.4.
63 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 64 (1932); 1 WmImsToN, CoNTRAcTs § 81 (3d ed. 1957).
The classic case on the point is Adams v. Lindsell, 1 Barn. & Add. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250
(K.B. 1818). For opposing views on the rule, compare Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract:
Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YAu L.J. 779, 795 (1939), with LANGDELL, SUMMARY OP THm
LAw oF CoNTRACTs 20-21 (2d ed. 1880).
64 Since "material" variances require express assent on the part of the offeror according
to § 2-207, comment 3, miscarriage of an acceptance containing a "material" variance is
equivalent to miscarriage of a proposal for an additional term and does not vitiate the con-
tract arising from the mailing of the acceptance itself. The additional terms of course do
not become part of the contract.
65 Since the confirmations are normally mailed at approximately the same time and
without knowledge of the terms on the other party's memorandum, it is impossible to deter-
mine which of the conflicting terms is the original proposal and which is the variance.
66 Section 2-207, comment 6: "If no answer is received within a reasonable time after
additional terms are proposed, it is both fair and commercially sound to assume that their
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will be treated as an objection by one party to the other's terms and the con-
tradictory terms will cancel each other. Thus providing an opportunity to
object, which may be important with respect to "immaterial" variances in an
acceptance or confirmation, is entirely unnecessary here since the other party
by hypothesis has objected to the terms in the miscarried memorandum con-
flicting with his own provisions. There would seem, then, to be no reason to
deny effect to those terms in a miscarried confirmation which create a contra-
diction between the two memoranda.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in the Roto-Lith case is illustrative of the misunderstanding
and misapprehension that have resulted from isolating section 2-207 from the
other sections of the Code dealing with the formation of a contract.67 To
some degree this isolation has been caused by the tendency of commentators
to treat each section of the Code separately with the resulting failure to inter-
relate sections relevant to a particular area of commercial dealing.68 As a
consequence, an individual section is distorted and its purpose largely sub-
verted. The Roto-Lith decision presents a graphic exemplification. Operating
under a misconception of section 2-207, the court reached what it felt to be
an absurd result69 and then, in order to avoid this "absurdity," formulated a
rule of interpretation which if accepted would almost completely vitiate the
section. The Roto-Lith case perhaps suggests that a minor redrafting of the
section would be beneficial in facilitating its application by the courts and the
bar.
The comments on section 2-207 might be altered to emphasize that it is
simply a mechanism to help the courts ascertain the intent of the parties and
the contents of any contract they form. As such it cannot be considered alone
but must be applied in conjuction with other provisions of the Code relating
to the formation of contracts. It may also be suggested that the clauses per-
inclusion has been assented to. Where clauses on confirming forms sent both parties conflict
each party must be assumed to object to a clause of the other conflicting with one on the
confirmation sent by himself. As a result the requirement that there be notice of objection
which is found in subsection (2) is satisfied and the conflicting terms do not become a part
of the contract. The contract then consists of the terms originally expressly agreed to, terms
on which the confirmations agree, and terms supplied by this Act, including subsection (2)."
67 As has been indicated, the most important of these sections sre §§ 2-202, 2-204, 2-206,
2-208 and 2-209.
68 This approach is especially pronounced in the various state annotations to the Code
and in those articles which attempt to compare the Code provisions with the existing com-
mercial law in a particular state. It is usually less apparent in the general commentaries
but the individual sections are isolated to some degree in almost all of these writings.
69 The absurdity that the Roto-Lith court thought it encountered was that if § 2-207 were
taken literally it would require businessmen to act "by rubric." 297 F.2d at 500. But properly
applied, § 2-207 and its allied sections lead to the opposite result, since the law will seek
to adapt itself to reasonable commercial expectations.
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tamining to conditional offers and conditional acceptances be made more ex-
plicit in regard to the necessity of "conspicuousness" so that they will be
accorded consistent treatment in the courts. In addition, it should be made
clear that even conspicuous words of condition are not conclusive proof of a
limited acceptance, but rather raise a presumption that can readily be rebutted
by evidence of conduct of the parties which indicates an intention to be legally
bound. Finally, as a footnote, it is submitted that an exception should be
made to the general rule governing "immaterial" variances to prevent terms
in a miscarried acceptance from becoming part of the contract.
This is not to suggest, however, that section 2-207 in its present form is
not capable of coherent application by the courts along the lines suggested.
Indeed, the contrary is urged. Thus it is hoped that subsequent courts will
reject Roto-Lith and its "unilaterally burdensome"70 standard as an abortive
attempt to apply section 2-207 and that they will take cognizance of, and
attempt to serve, the section's intended purpose. A change, albeit a minor
one, has been made in the law of sales contracts. Given intelligent interpreta-
tion by the courts, it will be a change for the better.
70 See notes 20, 21 and 26 supra and accompanying text.
